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1.

Introduction
A co11DOnly observed feature of agrarian societies in their

early stage of development is •hare-cropping together vith a credit
arrangement in which landlords provide credit (for consumption, working
1 The extensive
capital as well as investment) to their share croppers.
literature on aharecropping has not aatisfactorlly addressed the nature
of equilibrium in land, labour and credit urkets in such a context.

2

Further, the fact of credit linkage between a landlord and hia share
cropper vaa viewed u a form of exploitation of tenants by landlords.

3

The purpose of this paper 1a tvo fold:
(a) to derive and characterize the equilibrium in a model of a land-scarce,

labour-abundan t economy under •hare-cropping, given an infinitely elastic
aupply of identical ahare-croppera at a reservation utility.

The re-

aervation utility uy be determined either by aubsistence considerations
or by eamloyment opportunities available to a potential ahare cropper
al.aewhere in the economy.
(b)

to

demonetrate that in an iaperfect credit aarket, a landlord uy

2

offer credit to his tenant, 80metimes even at a aubsidi zed rate of
intere st, withou t necess arily inaisti ng that the •hare-c ropper bor
row only from him thus preclud ing an involun tary (from the point of
.
4
view of the tenant) linkage between credit and land transac
tions.
Boweve r,any legally or aociall y imposed constra ints on tenant 's share
(as for instanc e, a floor) 111ay provide incenti ves for a credit
tenancy linkage that 111ay otherw ise be absent.
In the followi ng section s we concen trate on a a>del of
linkage between land, labor and credit transac tions in·the contex t
of sharecr opping . 5

In order to explore the implica tions of policie s

such as land reform, subsidi zed credit , taxatio n and the outlaw ing of
1110neylending by landlo rds, ve take it as given that the only form of
tenancy is sharecr opping . 6 Other crucia l assump tions are that a
potent ial tenant is preclud ed, as part of the tenancy contra ct, from
workin g outside the farm as a part-ti me wage laborer and that there
are imperf ections in the capita l market in the form of differi ng costs
of capita l to the landlor d and to the tenant.
One major conclu sion of the paper is valid both in contex t
of credit- cum tenancy contra cts and in that of sharecr opping contra cts
alone.

It states that, as long as the landlor d can vary the size of the

plot given to a tenant and there are enough potent ial tenant s, the
equilib rium will be charac terized by 'utility -equiv alent' contra cts even
if the landlor ds do not possess any other instrum ent {e.g., share rent,
intere st rate).

That is, in equilib rium, a tenant 's utility obtaine d

3

have obtai n
throu ~h•ba recro pping will be the •ame aa that vhich he could
] uaer t, with
as a full- tiae wage labor er. Newbery and Stigl itz [1979
ed

conte xt of
out provi ding a •atiaf actor y proof , the •ame resul t in the
concl usion
ahare cropp ing aloae , while a daila r, though not ident ical,
(1969 ]. Our proof
ha• been obtain ed in a diffe rent •ettin g by Cheung
optim al
follow s from our resul t that, ceter is parib us, the tenan t'•
the plot he
effor t per hecta re is a decre asing funct ion of the •ize of
ing equil ilria
culti vates . Our aodel exclu des the possi biliti es of ration
n
in whic h• tenan t obtai ns a utilit y level excee ding hi• reser vatio
utili ty.

7

'l'he utili ty equiv alenc e resul t ha• the fundamental impli cation
r• ownership to
that polic ies other than land reform (i.e. , refor a that confe
the welfa re
the tenan t of the piece of land be 1• cultiv ating ) vill leave
of outpu t,
of each poten tial tenan t unalt ered while affec ting the level
exten t of tenan cy and the welfa re of landl ords.
With the poHi bility of landl ord• provi ding lbeir tenan ts with
n only
credi t, it 1• ahovu that landl ord• will resor t to that optio
ts' oppor tunity ccst
if their oppor tunity cost of capit al 1• lower than the tenan
credi t at a cost
of capit al. If the government offer • the tenan t subsi dized
rd will
lover than the landl ord'• oppor tunity cost of funds , the landlo
t to borrow
aove out of the tenan t'• credi t urke t and allow the tenan
aent subfrom the gover llMnt . The incre ase in surpl us due to goverm
ord u a
aidiz ation of tenan t'• credi t will fully accru e to the landl
cousequence of the utili ty equiv alenc e resul t.

Bence , aoxenunent

4

aubsidization of tenant's credit results only in the subsidiza
tion of landlords. Other partial reforms by the government, how
ever, may force the landlord to tie credit and tenancy contracts
(even if the government provides the cheaper source of credit)
thereby, leavinrthe tenant's utility unaltered at its pre-reform
level while affecting total output and the extent of tenancy.
Our 1110del thus provides one theoretical explanation for two almost
opposite phenomena that are sometimes observed:

low interest con

sumption loans from landlord to tenant and the opposite, high
interest, low volume loans.
We present the model in Section 2, followed by a characteriza
tion of the equilibrium in Section 3.

Section 4 discusses policies of

credit, land and tenancy reforms as well as the impact of taxation
and technical progress.

2.

The Model
Tne tenant's choices are limitea to the decision to be a share

cropper or not and the level of his work effort, if he decides to be
a sharecropper.

The landlord has at least one choice variable (plot

size) and at 110st four choice variables:

plot size, share rent, interest

rate and the amount of tied credit with land contract.

The principal

constraints are (1) an exogenously available level of utility for tenants
at which the supply of tenants is perfectly elastic and (2) tenants and
landlords are not free to mix contracts.

Given the tenant's choice be

havior, the landlord is a Von-Stackelberg maximizer of profits.

Formally,

ve shall first describe the tenant'• and landlord's problems and then

the equilibrium.
2.1

The Tenant
All worker• are identical facing cvo employment alternatives:

first as tenants on landlord'• land, or 1econdly 1 as wage labourers
elsewhere.

They cannot mix contracts.

8

Each tenant is offered a

plot of land, of size H hectares, in return for which he agrees to
pay the landlord a 1hare

(1-a)

of the harvest.

None of the workers

po1sess any 1avings at the beginning of the production period.

Wage

workers are paid during the production period and, therefore, have no
need to borrow for consumption.

The tenant, however, borrows at the

beginning of each aeason his entire consumption needs for the coming
aeason and repays bis loan with interest at the end of the 1eason after

harvest.

He does not atore any grain from one 1eaaon to the nex~ nor

does he have any investment opportunities.

9

v of hi• borrowings (either

The tenant obtains a proportion

wluntarily or a, a part of a "tie-in" package vith a tenancy contract)
per aeason. He obtains the
1
of bis borrowings from an alternative

from bis landlord at an interest rate
remaining proportion

(1-v)

r

aource (e.g., local moneylender, cooperative, government credit agency)
at an intere•t rate

rA

•

vhich be bas no influence.

Be treat•

r1

and

rA as parameters over

We assume that he cannot default partly

to aimplify the argumentation, and partly because in many areas landlords
virtually hold the harvested crop•• collateral, thus precluding default.
Clearly, if the tenant can borrow the entire present value of his consumption
at either

rT or

rA' he vill cbooae to borrow it from the cheaper 1ource.

6

However, since our discussio n focusses on tie-in contracts , we start
by assuming that the tenant takes

v

as given, so that

v > 0

will represent a tie-in condition over which he has no influence .
Labor provided by the tenant for cultivatio n (includin g all
operation s from land preparati on to harvestin g) is denoted by
where

L denotes the number of man-years per season and

the effort per man-year of labor.

Thus,

eL

eL,

e denotes

represent s labor in ef

ficiency units.· Output

Q is a concave function, homogenous of
degree one in B and et. 10 Thus:
Q • F(H, eL)
Assuming the number of man-year,

(1)
L, (i.e., labour in natural nunits) to

be exogenous ly fixed, we can set (without loss of generalit y)

L • 1.

Thus

we can rewrite (1) as:

Q•

!

X

where x

F{l, ex)= f(ex)

(2)

X

is man-years of labour per hectare of land,

is endowed with one man-year of labour,
size of the plot he is allotted.
product per hectare of land.

x

represent s the reciproca l of the

The function

By assumptio n,

Given that the tenant

f
f'

represent s the·avera ge
is positive and

f"

is

negative where the primes (single and double) denote the first and second
derivativ es of
is

a

f , respectiv ely.

The tenant's share of the harvest

and his income is therefore aQ.

Q

7

By our aHumption that the tenant borrows his entire conaumptior.
needs at the beginning of the eeason and has no carry-over •tock or 1.nvest
aent opportuniti es, it follows that his consumption
equals his income

c • l

in any eeason

at the end of the Hason, discounted by (1 + i) where

aQ

1 1a the effective interest rate on his borrowing.
vrT + (1 - v)rA.

c

Of course,

equals

i

Thus:

+ vrTcaQ+

(l

cs
I • 1 + vr +
(1 •
1

v)r.A

(3)

E SQ •

- v) r.A
I

clilcountad abara of the tenant.

(4)

We a••ume that the tenant's utility function U(c,e) is strictly
quasi concave in consumption and leisure, where leisure is defined as

i

=-e.

Furthermore , ve assume that both consumption and leisure are

normal goods.
e.

The tenant'• choice or control variable is
to work as a tenant unless

U(c, e)

Be will not choose

1a at least as large as

be could have assured himself by working

as

a wage laborer

U,

the utility

U is exogenously

given implying that the supply of tenants is infinitely elastic at

U.

Thus ve can eolve his choice problem in tvo eteps. First, let the maximized

wlue of U(c, e)

aubject to (3) be

tenant, othetwiae, •• a wage laborer.
Max

e

U(c (e) ,e)

u*.

If

U* ~

U,

be would work as a

Thu•, the tenant'• maxim1.zation problc
• .t. (2), and (3)

(5)

8

It is immediately apparent from (2)-(5) that the parameters
and

a

rA enter the tenant's constraint set and utility function

only through their effect on his discounted share

B. By substituting (2),

(3) and (4) in (5), maximizing with respect to e, we get the first order
condition:
(6)

It can be shown that the second order condition is satisfied from our strict
,

quasi-concavity assumption on U, and the strict concavity of
appendix).

We note also that (6) can be solved uniquely11 for

f (see
e

e • e(x, B)

to yield
(7)

Define effort per acre as

z - ex.

It follows (see appendix) that:

oz
1 •
--ox
2u1

(8)

X

Lemma
in

If U is strictly quasi-concave in

e, and

Proof:

c

and

-e

(c,-e), f

are normal goods, then

Strict quasi-concavity of

az
ox

>

is strictly concave

o

•

U and strict concavity of

the denominator of (8) is negative.

f

imply that

The normality conditions for c and -e

are:
(9)

and
(10)

9

They imply that the numerator is negative as well.

Bence,

.!!.
ax

> 0

• Q.t. D-

Thia lemma •tates that the tenant'• effort pe:r acre increases i.n.th c. rec:-....c-:i.or-.

in his plot aize even if the tenant's effort declines with such

a

reduction in plot size (increase in x).
Now,

(11)

This e%f)re••1on cannot be

■ igned.

Bence, effort per acre uy either

increase or decrease with a ceteris paribus increase in tenant'• share.
Denoting by

U*

the aaximized value of

U(c, e), it can be shown

(noting (6)) that:

au*
--ax

su

1

(f(z) - zf')
2

< 0

(12)

X

(13)

i.e., ceterie paribus~ an increase in the plot size and/or the discounted share
aake the tenant better-off.

10

2.2

The Landlord
■upply

With an infinitely elastic

of identical tenants, and constant

returns to scale in production, muilnizing profits is equivalent to 111.ximizing
profits per hectare.

Bence, our model yields the

different landlords possess different

■mounts

■ ame

results whether

of land or not.

Therefore,

v:l.thout loss of generality, we assume that all landlords are identical and
possess one hectare of land each, which they divide· into plots of ■ ize 1/x
to give each of x

tenants. As stated earlier, the landlord may require that

each of his tenants get a proportion v
interest rate

rT •

Assuming that an alternative use of funds would have

earned the landlord an interest of
.

city's bank), his income

•g

•

(1 - a) f (ex) ♦
X

of h1.s bor-rowings from him at an

g

r

L

1>er aeason (e.2. de?osits in the

from each tenant

C

V rT -

rL

)

is given by:

C

using (2) and (3)

using (2), (3) and (4)

11

Multiplying

&

by the number,

Jt

,

of ten.ants ve get the landlord's income

It 1a clur from (14) that the interut rate

rT

G

charged by t~e

landlord on hi1 loans to his tenant affects his income only through its
effect on

S, the diacounted •hare.
The landlord maximizes

given the tenant'• effort function
the plot •ize

G with respect to his choice variables
e(x, S).

The

choice variables include

1/x, and may include the tenant's crop .ahare a, v (if there

are no lava against the landlord providing credit) and

rT, the rate of

interest charged.
3.

Utility Equivalence and other equilibrium Properties
The equilibrium presented here 1• a contractual equilibrimn, i.e.

there 1• demand and •upply for contracts, vhere a contract con•i•t• of a
package including plot •ize 1 crop •hare, interest rate and tie-in condition.
It i•

~

a competitive equilibriwn aince the level of tenant'• reservation

utility 1• exogenously given, (e.g. by aubsistence factora) and, hence,
the landlord 1• facing a profit aaximization problem •ubject to an inequality
constraint on tenant'• reservation utility.

A competitive contractual

equilibrium, on the other hand, 1• characterized by landlord'• profit
maximization •ubject to equality conatraint on tenant'• utility, where
12
thi• utility level 1• generated by the competitive urket forces.

12

x (the number

For the moment, let us focus only on the choice of

of tenants or, equiva lently, the plot size per tenant ), thus keeping e
fixed in particu lar. Since f is an increas ing functio n of its argume nt
ex= z , and since

z

is an increas ing functio n of

x [see (8)], the

x: in other words, a decreas e in the

landlo rd's income (14) increas es with

tenant 's plot size,wh ich therefo re leads to therhir ing of more tenant s,
increas es the landlo rd's profits .
that a tenant 's utility

u*

Thus, if at any value of

x

On

the other band, it follows from (12)

in sharecr opping dec'I'ea8es as

x

increa ses.

the tenant 's utility exceeds his utility U

in the alterna tive use of his labor (so that he chooses to be a tenant ),
the landlo rd, by increas ing x,
tenant toward s

U.

As

can increas e his income while pushing the

long as th.ere are enough potent ial tenants , that is,

as long as th.ere is no upper limit on x,

the landlo rd's choice x

3
be to push the tenant to a utility level equalli ng U.1- Hence

we

will

can

state the followi ng basic propos ition.

'PZ'oposition 1:

The equilib rium in the land-la bor market will be charac terized

by utility equiva lent contra cts.
It ahould be noted that this propos ition does not depend for its
validi ty on the presenc e or absence of any linkage between tenancy and credit
transac tions.

The landlo rd's use of plot size as his sole instrum ent variab le

outcome
is suffici ent to result in a utility equiva lent contra ct equilib rium, an
obtaine d by Che~ (1969) under a differe nt structu re.

Our structu re is that

initiat ed by Stiglit z [1974] and utilize d by Newbery and Stiglit z (1978].
Assuming a separa ble utility functio n, they claimed (Newb ery-Sti glitz [1979,
ive
p.16]) , that compet ition between landlor ds will elimin ate the less attract
contra cts and will drive the inequa lity

u*

>

U to equalit y thereby achievi ng

13

utility equivalen ce.

As demonstra ted in Propositi on 1, the utility

equivalen ce outcome results from profit maximizat ion and not from competitio :-,.
5or is the propositi on trivial, arising solely from the fact that there is
an infinitel y elastic •upply of potential tenants at

of an excess applicant s equilibriu m at

u*

>

U , 1ince the possitilit ::

U can occur if only the output

1hare instead of the plot size is the control variable of the lanelord.

A

vell-knov n case of excess applicant s equilibriu m arose under the efficienc y
wage hypothesi s (e.g., see Leibenste in [1957], Mirrlees [1976] and Stiglitz

(1976]),p r:lmarily because the landlord is not allowed to use an instrumen t
completel y orthogona l ~o effort to reduce

••

U to U without affecting effort.

In our 110del, the uae of the power to vary the plot aize, although non
orthogona l to effort, guarantee s the utility equivalen t contract result

aince the tenant'• effort per acre increases with a reduction in his plot
14
Additiona l instrumen ts such as cropshare and interest rate are not
aize.
needed for this purpoae.
Of the

twig

a•sumptio n1 used in deriving our resul. t, namely, that

both consumpti on and leisure are normal goods, and that the tenant ii pro
hibited, a1 part of hi• contract, from working• • a part-time laborer
outside the farm, the latter i• perhaps a,re controve rsial.
is primarily an empirical i11ue.

It b

Its realism

true that tenanu often work as

part-time laborers, but the extent of auch work 11 limited.

There

ia also aome evidence to 1ug~eat that landlord• believe that a tenant
will put areater effort into cultivatio n, the amaller hi• plot aize.

14

From the utility equivalence
U {c(x,S), e(x,S)} • U

(15)

where
c(x,S). S f{e(x,S)x}
X

we can solve for

of the

x(the inverse of the plot size) as a function x(S)

discounted share,

S. By appropriate differentiation of (15) (see Appendix)

we obtain:
fx
> 0
-dx .. --,,.,,,...;;;;..,..-,-S(f-f'z)

dS

(16)

•

i.e., in order to maintain the tenant on his iso-utility curve, the landlord
must increase the tenant's discounted share if he reduces the plot size.

S, unless otherwise specified,

Thus, from now on when analyzing changes in
we assume that the landlord changes

x along the curve

0

=_ f'(f-zf')

so as to

U.

maintain the tenant at a welfare level of
Now, denote

x(S)

as the elasticity of substitution between

ff"z

effective labor, e, and land.
It is shown in the Appendix that.
de{x(8), 8} • ~ dx +
3x dS
d8

ae •

u f'
1

as

(1-o)
C1

(17)

Hence:

Proposition 2: The tenant's effort e
as his discounted share
of substitution o

increases, stays the same, or decreases

S in output increases, according as the elasticity

is greater than, equal to or less than unity.

15

z ,

hecta re,
It is •hown furth er in the Appe ndu, that effor t per
•atis fie6:

~
dB

(H)

> 0

separ able
Ne~e ry and Stig litz [1979 ) deriv ed (17) &s6uming a
it. However, all the
utili ty funct ion in a model that did not featu re cred
re6 of the mode l.
resu lts deriv ed so far do not utili ze the cred it fe.atu
ord,
Turni ng now to the other choic e varia bles of the landl
(a, v, rT), it can be ahown by writi ng his income as
(19)

C • (1 - 88)f( ex)
vhere

e•

(a, v, rT)

1 + vrL + (1 - v)rA , that

e,

8 and

their effec t on

!£
ae • -

and

e

•ince

x

C only throu gh

enter

are funct ions of

e only .
(20)

Sf < O.

e

will choos e his optim al
This means that an income ma.xi mizin g landl ord
to be:

e

8* • Minimum feasi ble

and then choos e

the choic e of

for any given

(1-se*) f (ex)

8 to aaxi.mize

•

Since

O and 1), if the &1•en value of

(which lies between

N~

e

(21)

e depends only on '\/
B does not restr ict

v, then:
and

V

*

•

1

if
(22)

and

Thus , to ainim ize

e

v • 0

if

is to give a weig ht of 1 to the smal ler inter est rate,

and a weig ht of Oto the large r one.
Row, by defin ition ,

8•

• The range for
a
1 + vrT + (1-v) rA

e

16

[O, l].

is therefo re
if

(a, rT)
■pecified

v* • 1

floor

aF

e*-

&E[O, l]

a •

on

rL •< r A , the landlor d can set
, (that is a and rT) to maximize

Thus, in the case

+ rL and choose

1

can be reache.d by a auitabl e choice ot

This holds true even if there is an institu tionall y

1 .

\I -

and

And any

s

rL -=< r A the landlor d is
the cheaper source of credit and by offerin g credit with tenancy (settin g

G •

In essenc e, what is happen ing is that, with

'V

*

-

the landlor d ensures that the tenant uses the cheape r source of credit.

a.

choice of
■uitable

Now with v • 0, any

choice of

a

se

that

making

> 1

1

[O, 1 + r ]
A

B in

as long as there is no floor on

is irrelev ant for maximi zing
80

are not attaina ble through

v • O, then values of

If

-

And

s>

1

1 + rA

rL > r A since then 8 :'. 1 + rA
Thus we can assert , using (22), that the

G when

G < 0 •

landlo rd's optima l choice is

a •

can be reached by a

v* • 0 if

r

1

> rA.

Once again, the land

lord ensures that the tenant gets credit from the cheape r source.

We can

therefo re state:

Propos ition 3:

,
The landlo rd, with no restric tion on his choice of crop shares

will ensure that the tenant gets credit from the cheape r source.
event that he is the cheape r source
tenancy contra ct with credit .

In the

he does this by offerin g a

(rLi rA),

In the case where

rA > rL, he does this by

not offerin g any credit to the tenant.

Remark: As discuss ed above, in the case of rL

!

rA where offerin g credit is

optima l, it remains optima l even if there is an institu tional ly imposed
floor on the tenant 's crop share, the reason being that any given
S

=l+ra

(and a
T

· · the optima l S) can be achieve d with an infinit e
fio~t wr~

d
number of pairs (a, rT), of which, another infinit e set will meet the require
floor.

1)

17

Propositio n 3 1• consisten t with empirical observatio ns (Bardhar.
and Rudra (19
tenants.

)) that landlords frequentl y offer interest- free loans tc t:-H::. :-

For example, in the case of

r

<

L •

r , with v• • 1, the
A

charged by the landlord is essential ly arbitrary , an: i:

interest rate

could as well be zero.

Hence, if there is no floor on

a

the situation observed is not really one of tie-in, since
the parties can untie the transacti ons without altering the outcome.
This will not be the case, however, if the environme nt facec by the parties
is subject to certain constrain ts such as governmen t regulatio ns.

This

topic will be covered 1n the next aection.
Returning to the case where there is no floor on
seen that if
the range for
G•

e• •

rl .! rA ,

(1

+ r L)

S is (0, 1/(l+rL )].

and with

aF, we have

G • [l - S(l + rl)]f(ex) ,

If

(1 - S(l + rA)]f(ex) , the range for B is [O, 1/(1 + rA)].

case,

G, being a continuou s ftmction of S , defined over a compact set,

attains its maximum.
ve have

In either

If this maximum is attained at an interior point,

*•-

l*f + Cl• s*eit'!e<•x)

- l*f + (1 - l ..*)f'[e: ; +

•

0

x::1 • 0

or
uain& (16)

or

-ex!'
f

of labour in crop output.

is the imputed share

Vain& Propoaiti0 11 2, ve can u1ert that

•~• : S accordiD& u

o

51

(23)
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In the case where

r

<

L-

and in the case where

rL

Since in the first case
crop share

a*

r

A '

e• •

(1 + rL)

e• • (1 + rA) and B* • a*/(1 + rA) •

rA,

>

rT

can be chose n to be

in eithe r case.

rL, 8*8*

becomes the

So using (22) we can state :

Propo sition 4:

If there is no restr ictio n on the landl ord's choic
e

of instru ments

(a, v, rT) , and optim al strate gy for him invol ves

his offer ing his tenan t a crop share
as

a*

such that

accor ding

>
a • 1 .
<

RBnrrrk:

In the cue o~ rL

!

a*(l

rA aince

.

with

can offer an

S*e* •

(l

rT 1uffi cieut ly less (grea ter) than

a* which is less (grea ter) than

+r )
+ r\ ,

by choos ing

T

rL , the landl ord

S , even if

a

is great er

(lua) than UDity .

Newbei-y

and Stigl itz [1979 ] estab lished Propo sition 4 witho ut

incor porat ing credi t or its linkag e to tenan cy.

The above remar k exten ds

their resul t to a case where it is optim al for the tenan
t to borrow from
his landl ord. It also impli es that it is possi ble to obser
ve crop_ share s
lower than the imputed share of labor even for a produ ction
funct ion -with
an elast icity of subst itutio n large r than 1.
4. Polic y Analy sis
4.1

Tenancy Reforms
First , consi der a reform which impos es a floor ,

tenan t's share

a

of the harve st.

reform laws in India .
if in an equil ibrium

aF, on the

This is a common featu re of many agrar ian

As discu ssed earli er in the case where

(a*, 1, r;)

rL

~

rA,

prior to the promu lgatio n of the

reform law the landlo rd was offer ing a crop share below
the legal floor
aF, he will raise the crop share after its promu lgatio n
to

°F

and at
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the same time raise the inter est rate to

so

aF

equil ibriW D

l + r**

that in the ne~

Cl*

• _,,_l_+
__
r_*_ • 8 *

Since outpu t
T
T
8* , it is imaff ected by refon n.
Given utili ty equiv alenc ~.
the tena nt's welfa re is unaff ected anyway.
depends only on

Suppose now that the legal floor is imposed.

Cons ider the

follo wing two alter nativ es: (1) an initi al equil ibriu
m in which the landlord is not the cheap er sourc e of cred it, i.e.,
so that \I*
0
C

S* •

a*

with a* < aF, or (ii) initi ally r <
l + rA
L- rA and v* s l t
a*
S* •
1 + rT wit~ a* < · ~ . However, as part of a tenan cy refor m, the
inter est rate on the tena nt's alter nativ e sourc e of cred it
i~ broug ht belo..,.·
rL.

In other word s,alo ng with the floor

which bring s .it below

rL •

aF, there is a change in

rA

This joint refor m of tenan cy and cred it,

could be viewe d as two conse cutiv e refor ms•

first a cred it refor m with

no tenan cy refor m, ao that the landl ord awitc hes to
the equil ibriu m with one
aster isk from one with two aster isks and then to a
tenan cy refor m impo sing
a floor . This way, it auffi ces to discu ss only the
tenan cy refor m.
In aucb a situa tion the landl ord can parti ally
nulli fy the

tenan cy refor m by f01'Cib1,y ·• ~ying

the cred it and tenan cy contr act••

In a techn ical aense , even in this case, the
tenan cy refor m may be

aade ineff ectiv e.

For exam ple, consi der a seque nce of contr acts offer ed

to the tenan t, the aeque nce index ed by n: (a•~
n
n
• yn •{aF- S*(l+ rA)} / n8 * ,rT
• n) •
Clea rly, vn > 0 aince in the initi al equil ibriu m
S*(l+ rA) • a*< aF
and for large enough n , v11 will be less than one.

Thus , for large

enough n , each member of the aeque nce is a feasi ble
contr act.
•

The plot aize aeque nce is z(Sn ).

Ncn.·
As
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n ~~,an

converges to
By choosing

n

aF,

vn

converges to zero,
large,

sufficiently large (thereby making

but finite), the landlord can remain as close as he wishes to his income
15 What this
prior to the imposition of the floor even after the reform!
argument suggests is that, after the reform there is no optimal policy
for the landlord, but there exist policies that will give him an income
as close as he wishes to his income prior to reform.

Since, prior to reform,

he was maximising his income without the floor constraint on the tenant's
crop share, that income provides an upper bound to his income after reform.
Since policies exist, which get as close as one likes to this upper bound,
this upper bound is the least upper bound.
The implication of the above discussion is that, if tyiDg is
permitted, the landlord can reduce the tenancy and credit reform to
Suppose now that the government bans tying

insignificance.

, along with

tenancy and credit reforms. Clearly the landlord's income will decline, while
the tenant's welfare continues to be at the level he could have achieved while
working as a wage labourer.

What about the effect on output?

Since the

landlord ~o longer has the instrument by which he can maintain the pre-reform
discounted share,
know from (18) that
16
Thus:
up.

Proposition 5:

S* , of the tenant, the reform will
d(z)/dS > O,

raise

we can assert that output

8. Since we
f(z)

will go

A tenancy reform which imposes a floor on the tenant's share

of the crop with or without credit reform (to make credit available to the
tenant at a rate lower than the landlord's opportunity cost of capital), will
have no effect on output.

If it is coupled with a ban on tying

.of credit

and tenancy transactions, it will raise output, reduce the tenant's plot size
and increase the number of tenants.
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Nov cons ider only a ba~ on

tyin g

This

of cred it and tena ncy.

is not the chea per sour ce of
1.s,o f cour se, meaning1ess when the lanr lord
anY"-ay.
Suppose the ban is
cred it, sinc e no tyin g will be obse rved
i.e. , vhen
imposed when the land lord is offe ring cred it,

rL !.. rA and

v• • 1.

In the
cred it to the tena nt to
Clea rly, this immediately rais es the coat of
g v at zero (i.e ., prev e.nti ng
land lord 's income m.axittization prob lem, fixin
~s 6 from its opti =al valu e of
link ing) , fixe s e at (1 + rA), i.e. , rais
C is a mon ototi c decr easi ~g
1 + rL prio r to the ban to (l+ rA). Sinc e
lower than befo re. Clea rly, even
func tion of e. at any vaZ:tc of S • C is
This means that land lord 's inco ~e
-wit h the opti mal valu e of 8 • C 1• love r.
long as f(z) as a func tion o!
defi nite ly goes dovn~ ~'hat abou t outp ut? As
e is e decr easi ng func tic~ of
8 is conc ave, optil:ia.l S for any srec ifie d
to (1 + rA), optilZla.l 6 goes
e. Bence, as e is incr ease d from_ (1 + rL)
t>lot size incr ease s the.r eby
.down. This means that firs tly, the opti mal
f (z) is
butp ut goes down sinc e
redu cing the number of tena nts and •eco ndly ,

an incr easi ng func tion of

S.

4.2 Land Refotin

I
I

Suppose •tar ting from an init ial equi libri um

and
[a• • v* • r*J
T

the plot he. cult fvat es and has
s{S* ), each tena nt 1a give n the ownership of
land lord . Clea rly, the tena nt's
_ to fore go the oppo rtun ity to borr ov from one
a*
and S• • l + rA • With refo n:
ve.l.fare impr oves ,. for if rL > rA, v* • 0
so that the tena nt'• (now a lane a becomes unit y, rA rema ins unchanged
e the •ize of the plot
ng peas ant' s) disc ount ed shar e e incr ease s, whil

owni

remains the same.
util ity)

its dis
Benc e, with out chan ging , his effo rt e, (and

tota l util ity.
be v:111 &&in in consumption and, henc e,

ly opti l:lal ly

rais e his util ity even furt her.
. adju stin g his affo rt to the changed S, he c&n
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rL ~ rA,

Now if

initial ly

v* • 1.

Since, the landlor d is

indiffe rent in this case between alterna tive combin ations of
result in his optima l

s*,

a

to mainta in the same

share to unity.

which

we can view the land reform , as if it first

changed the interes t rate charged by the landlor d to
change in

(a, rT)

s*

rA with a corresp onding

and then raised the tenant 's crop

The two moves togethe r imply that the tenant 's post-re form

discoun ted share is higher .

From this point, the argume nt is the same as

in the previou s case.
What about the effect of land reform on output?
increas es the discoun ted share
output is
e

f[e(B)x ]

where

x

Land reform

8 while keeping the plot size fixed.
is fixed.

to maximi ze his utility , given any

8

Thus,

Since the former tenant will choose
and

x , we know from equatio n (A. 13)

in the Appendix that

(24)

where

~

denotes the negativ e denomi nator.

the tenant.

Now,

fil.
X

is the consum ption of

Hence

accordi ng as
(25)

1!.
as ->

0

implies that outpu_t increas es, remains unchang ed or decreas es as

increas es.

8

Thus:

Proposition 6: A land reform which confers owners hip to the plot of land
that a tenant used to cultiva te in a sharecr opping contra ct with a landlor
d
0
0
will increas e, uot change , or decrea se output , accord ing as -c
11 _ 21)
( ul
u2

~
>

1.
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(25) repreaent• the elasticity of the marginal rate of substitution
The tenant maY.i~izes

between conaumption and lei•ure with respect to con•umption.

tJ[c, e] aubject to

U

X

between

and

c

(MllT) between
At
and

e

in U is - _£

ue

and

c

Ncn. the marginal rate of aub•titution (MF.:.i

c • S f(xe) •

e

and the marginal rate of tranaformatio"

through production is

given x and

e,

de
•
de

Sf'(xe).

d Log (MRT) • l
d Log

e

. d Log (MRS) • d Log (MRS)
d Log c
d Log S

• d Log (MRS)
d Log C

Since

for optimality MRT • MRS, the impact of a change 1n

S

on e

is

obtained by a compariaon of the two elasticities.
Furthermore, consider the case of a aeparable utility function, i.e.,
U(c, e) • u(c) - v(e).

h :

U<

0

Then (25) becomes

according as

(26)

The negative of the elasticity of urginal utility

by Arrow (1971] as the aeasure of relative risk aversion.

The

u"c

<-;-->

is definec

intuitive

explanation for the value of this elasticity to be of relevance 1n our case,

even though there 1• no uncertainty, ii the following:
increue in

8 increaae• tenant'• income;

On

the one hand, an

hence, the urginal utility of

incoae declinu relative to the aarginal disutility of effort, and ceteris

paribua~ the new J.udcnmer vould like to reduce his effort.

On the other

hand, bia ah.are in the marginal productivity of effort increases, vi.th increasillg

I, thua creating an incentive for aore effort. Whether the inc011e effect or
the ur11Aal productivity effect is the dominant force depend• aolely on the

elasticity of the •r&inal. utility.
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to more owners than the
Where land refo rm dist ribu tes the land
Ull l.!21) > 1
l outp ut even if -c ( U. -U
tota
ease
incr
may
it
ors,
ivat
cult
inal
orig
2
1
·
plot size .
in
ns
incr ease s with redu ctio
sinc e ~ete ris pari bus, outp ut per hec tare

4.3

Tax atio n and Tec hno logi cal Prog ress

ona l outp ut tax at the
Suppose the government imposes a prop orti
the rura l community) in orde r to
rate t on tena nts and land lord s (i.e .,
Sinc e for any 8 this tax is equ ival ent
rais e food to feed the urba n wor kers .
tena nt from 8 to µ = S(l- t), the
to redu cing the disc oun ted shar e of the
mes e(x, µ). It is also eas ily seen that
tena nt's deci sion func tion e(x, S) beco
x( µ) • Thu s, for any give n 8
the land lord 's choi ce set x(B) becomes
the afte rtax income. of the land lord is:
(i.e . befo re tax shar e of the tena nt),
G • (1-t ) (1-e e*)f (z)

and

e!x( µ),µ ] x(µ) .., z(µ)

z •

where

e* -= 1 + r L
• 1

+

if

TA

if

The land lord choo ses

8

to maximize

GS • :~ -= (1-t ) [-e* f

G, imp lyin g th.a t:

+ (l-'8 9*) f' (z)

*]•

O.

(27)

the optimum we obta in:
Now by tota l diff eren tiat ion of (27) at

~< 0

dt

(see App endi x,Pa rt B)

(28)

Furt herm ore,
df (z(µ )) • £' ~ dµ < O
dµ dt
dt
by (18) and (28) .

(29)
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l tax. The implie c
i.e., outpu t declin es due to the impos ition of a propo rtiona
in the tenan t's plc~
decli ne in the after tax 1hare , ~ , neces sitate s an incre ase
reserv ation utili ty U. The incre ast
■ ize in order to maint ain the tenan t on his
of tenan ts, x, and a
in plot size impli es both a reduc tion in the number

-

decli ne in outpu t.

P?-opositior. 7:

We thus obtai n the follo ~g propo sition :

anc
The impos ition of a propo rtiona l outpu t tax on landlo rds

the plot size per
tenan ts will cut the after tax ahare of the tenan t, incre ase
outpu t.
tenan t, and reduc e the number of tenan ts as well as total
to mode lling
Mode lling a ticks neutr al techn ical change 1• equiv alent
cal change is a
a propo rtiona l outpu t tax, i.e., a 1lick.a neutr al techn ologi
only differ ence
ahift in A where the produ ction funct ion is Af(e.x ). The
neutr al techn ical
is the direc tion of the impac t. Bence , conai derin g a ticks
chang e and apply ing

Propo ■ition

7, ve obtai n:

after tax
P?-oposition 8: A 1licks neutr al techn ical change will incre ase the
tenan t and incre ase
disco unted •hare of the tenan t, decre ase the plot aize per
the numb u of tenan t• aa well •• total outpu t.
ion.
Now, conai der the caae of a Cobb-Douglas produ ction funct
the unit ela1t icity of
~

= 8(1-t )

■ubstitution,

Given

the tenan t'• effor t is indep enden t of

ly
(aee (17)) , i.e., the decli ne in the after tax ahare is total

tenan t's effor t
compe nsated by the incre ase in plot aize ao as to leave the
the optim al e is
unalt ered. Furth ermor e, it is easil y aeen using (23) that
Douglas case, all
unaff ected by the tax or techn ical chang es. For the Cobbneutr al chang es.
factor -augm enting techn ical chang es can be viewed aa Hicks
chang e and apply ing
Thus conai derin g irriga tion as a land augmenting techn ical
Propo aition 8, ve obtai n:

--- --- --- --
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Proposition 9:

If the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type,

introducing irrigation will leave the discounted share contract unaltered,
decrease the plot size for tenant and increase the number of tenants as well
as total output. 17
4.4

Increase in the Tenant's Utility Level in an Alternative Occupation
Suppose, for example, that through an increase in the non-agricul tural

wage rate, the utility that the tenant could obtain (i.e.,
alternative occupation increases.

S, it is clear that

U only by raising the plot size, therefore

reducing the number of tenants and output.

Proposition 10:

in an

Assuming once again a Cobb-Douglas production

function, so that the tenant's effort is independent of
the landlord can ,peet the higher

U)

Equilibrium

S is unchanged.

Hence:

If the production function is Cobb-Dougla s, any increase in

the utility that the tenant can obtain 1n an alternative occupation will raise
the equilibrium plot size, reduce the number of tenants and output, while
leaving the discounted crop share unaltered.
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S. Conclusio ns
In conclusio n. ve •um:nari~e our results.

Our main result

is that in a world in which (1) productio n takes

place under constant returns to •cale in land and labor in efficienc y units,
(ii)a landlord can •ubdivide his.land into as many plots as he chooses. and

(iii) a tenant choo•es his effort, •o as to maximize his utility -equilibr ,iur.
vill be character ized by utility equivalen t contracts .

In other words. even

if a landlord has no power over crop ahares or terms of credit, by choosing
the plot aize appropria tely, he vill force the tenant to a utility-le vel equal
to that which he (the tenant) could have obtained in an alternativ e occupatio n
•• long as there are enough potential tenants.

Be is able to do this not only

becau•e there is a perfectly elastic supply of tenants at this 'reservat ion'
utility level, but al•o because the tenant's effort per hectare increases t.ri.th a

J'eduction in his pt.ct •iae.
This result 1a similar to that found in Cheung'• model (1969), where

the tenant'• effort per unit of raw labor is invariant .

Cheung •hows that

landlords will provide each tenant a plot of land on which the tenant can earn
no aore than be could have earned in an alternati ve occupatio n.

Where.as

enforceme nt of the tenant'• labor input is necessary in a Cheungian world, it
takes a different form in our .:,del:

it ensures that the tenant does not

split his working time between abarecrop ping and an alternati ve occupatio n.
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In this wi;>rld of utility equivalent contracts, it will be
1A the interest of the landlord to ensure that the. tenant
from the cheapest aource.

a•ta

his credit

If the landlord's opportt.m.ity coat of capital

is lover than that charged by the local moneylender, the. landlord will

an.sure. that the. tenant gets credit at the chupest interest cost by offer
ing him a credit contract.
if it is optimal.

This often is not imposed, but chosen, only

The tenant is pushed down to his alternative utility

level, not by the credit instrument, but by plot size variations.
Finally, in our model, utility equivalence implies that nothing short
of land reform wil~ affect the tenant's welfare, as long as he is a tenant.
Indeed, other reforms such as setting a floor on the tenant's share of
the crop, making credit available to the tenant at a cost below the opportunity cost of capital to the landlord or banning the tying of credit and tenancy
contracts, either have no effect on the equilibrium at all or have an effect
on the number of tenants, output and the landlord's income.

APPENDIX

Propert ies of the Model

Part A:

Denote the tenant'• utility function as
consump tion and effort, respect ively.
U(c,e)

V{c, i). which implies that:

E

Qu.asi-e oncavity of V{c, e)

where

U(c,e)

i • - e.

Define leisure,
V

•U

V

(c,e)

denote

Bence,
•l'

\'

"' ,.

• U V •-t;
1· 2 2' 11 11• 22 22' 12 -~12·
1
means that for the 180-uti lity V(c, eJ • V, c is a
V

i, i.e.:

convex function of

v2
ac
--v-1
ae

{A. l)

and

Bence, quasi-co ncavity of V(c, I)

c

!tow, for

I

and

=U(c,

e)

(A. 2)

implies that:

to be norr.al goods the followin g two conditio ns must

be aatiafie d:
(A.4)
We further assume that the tenant'• consump tion equals his income.
C •

i .e. I

8 f(ex)
z

that:

Sap lying
~

.!.S. • 8 f' > 0
le

and

~2
" c • 8 z f" < O

(A.5)

.;z-

by the atrict concavit y of the product ion function

f(u).

A.2

Let

♦ (e)

• U(c(e), e).

Hence:

~+U
1 ae
2

,, (e) • U

(A.6)

and
~" (e) •

2
2
( 3c) + 2U 1£. + U + U 1..£.
11 ae
12 ae
22
1 ae2 •

U

calculating the second order conditions at the optilllum (~'(e) • 0)
we obtain:
~"(e) -= UlS:z:f" + (u; ull - 2Ul2U2Ul + u2211i)

+

<

o.

(A. 7)

Ul

By the strict quasi-concavity of

U and strict concavity of

f, ,"Ce)< 0

illlplies the existence of a maximum to the tenant's problem.
To determine the illlpact of a reduction in plot size (increase in
on tenant's effort per acre,

we denote

ex

=z

x)

•

Thus, (A.6) can be rewritten as:

u [ Sf (z)
1

x

.! ] Bf' (z) + U [6 f (z)

'x

2

x

Total differentiat1~n of (A.6') with respect to
az {u Sf" + Bf' cu
OX

1

11

~

.=. ] •

'x

(z,x)

O•

(A. 6')

yields:

+ u12) + u218f' + u22 J

X

X

X

X

Collecting terms and utilizing the first order conditions (i.e.

we obtain:
(A.S)

!.
~"
X
(A.8} is positive since

f'< 0 by (A. 7), and the numerator is negative by

the normality conditions, (A.4 ) •

A. 3

Now, following the utility equivalence result (Proposition 1) the relation

(A. 9)

determines

x(8).

Applying the envelope theorem

( ♦' (e) •

we obtain:

0),

(A.10)

de

The next two terms we •hall calculate are

dB

and

.!!!_

dB

where
dz•.!!. x'(S) + .!!. • x'(S)
dB

+

de

(A.11)

+ .!!. - x' (B)e] •

(A.12)

as

ax

e

x dB •

Bence,

!!. • !x [ .!!.
ax x'
dB

{S)

as

.

So in order to evaluate (A.11) and (A.12) we have only to calculate

az
<ax

az
.
as

1a given by (A.S)).

ly total differentiation of (A.6') with respect to

z

and

B 'hoZding x

constant ve obtain:

-- az
as

Clearly

f'U1 + ¼l (-Ullu2+u21Ul)

•

(A.13)

ae az 1
ii • ii • s .

Sub1tituting (A.13), (A.8) and {A.10) into (A.11) we obtain:

(A.14
f
(A.14) la poaitive by the normality conditions (A.4) and aince f-f 'z >l

due

A.4

to the strict concavity of

f

and

f(o) • 0.

In the same manner, calculating A.12 and defining

o

=_

de
---=

f'(f - zf')
ff"z
, we obtain

u f'

1-cr

1

d8

Part B.

•

(A.15)

C1

Comparative Statics:

a Proportional Output Tax,

Define the landlord's objective function as
substituted the condition

x[8(1-t)]

G(8,t). (We already

into the objective function).

Recall

the first order condition in the text (equation (27)) i.e.,
Gs • (1-t) [ .-e* f

+ (1-se*) f' (z) Zs ] -= 0 •

(A.16)

By total differentiation of (A.16) we obtain

(A.17)
and

G • (1-t) [-2e*f'z
88
6

+ (1-80*) f"(z ) 2 + (1-se*)f'zsS]
6

(A.18)

and
G

G • - ~
St
1-t

+ (1-t) [-e*f'z t + (1-se*)f"ztzDp + (l-80*)f'zatl
p

Now define the aftertax

share as

zS • zµ(l-t) • -(l;t) zt

z

2
88• (1-t) zµµ

µ - 8(1-t).

(A.19)

Hence:
(A.20)

(A.21)
(A.22)

A.5

ve obta in:
Sub stitu ting {A.20) and (A.22) into (A.19)

Ge

• - -1-t + (1-t ) [
G"t
p

1
- c1- 0pot'\*>f' c 1-t

By

zs

+

e*f' e

Cl-e€*) f"e

1-t

1-t

2

(A. 2 3)

ze

8

- >1
I=t ·se

in:
coll ecti ng term s and reca lling (A.18) we obta
S

GS

- 1-t
et •

G

At the opti mal

S:•S

(A. 24)

f'z e - -1-t Ges

(t),

GS•

0.

+ ..L f'z
!L • ..L
B
Gee
1-t

Benc e:

(A. 25)

•

dt

The impa ct of tax poli cy on

lJ

is:

dB
du
S + (1-t ) -dt •
•
-=dt

{A.26)

By sub stitu ting (A.25) into (A.26) ve obta in:
(A.2 7)

c

68

·< 0

Benc e,

::
by the aecond orde r cond ition s for maximum, and

dlJ
dt

< 0 •

>

O (see A.14 ).

Furt herm ore,
(A. 28)

t
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Footnotes

•The views

and conclusio ns presented in this paper are the
aole responsib ility of its authors and should not ·be attribute d to
the World Bank. We thank Clive Bell, Wilfred Candler, Gershon
Feder, Luis Guasch, Pradeep Mitra and an anonymous referee for
helpful comments on an earlier draft and Vivianne Lake for editorial
assistanc e •. Also comments made at seminars at the World Bank, Harvard,
Michigan and at Stanford were helpful.
1

See Bardhan [1980), Bardhan and Rudra [1978, 1980a, 1980b and
1981], Bharadwaj [1974), on India and for instance, Ransom and Sutch
[197ij] on the Post-tiellu m Southern United States.
2

Bell and Zusman [1976], Cheung (1969], Marshall [1959], Newberry
[1977], Reid [1973], Newbery and Stiglitz [1979] and Stiglitz (1974].
3
Bhaduri (1973, 1977). We will be using the terms 'tenant'
and share-cro pper interchan geably, though strictlysp eakin~ the tenant
is one who leases in land at a fixed rent (cash or kind) per season.
4Bardhan and Rudra (1978].
5

We do not discuss in this paper other rationale s for interdistribut ion of in
linking such as uncertain ty and asyumetri cal
matters, See,
these
On
tenants.
and
landlords
formation between
Braverman
(1980),
Stiglitz
and
averman
Bell ·and Zusman (1980),.Br
(1980).
Mitra
and Guasch (1980) and
60ne economic reason for the emergence of sharecrop ping
contracts is the following : If only incentive problems exist (i.e.,
the landlord can neither force the worker to contribut e a specified
level of effort nor can he monitor it), the fixed-ren t contract will
be best suited to remedy them. It will, in fact, dominate a fixedwage or a sharecrop ping contract. The tenant obtains all the fruits of
his effort after paying the fixed rent. Fixed rents, however, imply that
the tenant •ust bear all risk resulting from output uncertain ty due to
exogenous condition s (e.g. weather, illness). If the tenant is risk
averse, auch a contract will be inefficie nt, in which case a share
cropping contract will dominate it.
70n

efficienc y wage and rationing equilibri a see Leibenste in
(1957], Mirrlees (1976] and Stiglitz (1976].
8

See discussio n of this assumptio n in Section 3 below.

91nve 1tar~ t in a di1ta nt bank 11 unatt racti ve for a poor and often ,
illit erat e tenan t.
101e11 and Braverman (1970) ahow that, if the produ ction funct ion
rtain ty, landl ords
11 of const ant retur n• to acale and there ia no unce
ing. Bove ver, this
cropp
vill prefe r culti vatio n vith vage labor to ahare
ve do not give the
se
becau
re1u lt doea not apply to the prese nt analy aia
r and becau se of
labou
landl ord the optio n of aelf- culti vatio n with wage
rt and behav iour
effo
ts'
othe r ruao na conce rning the aode lling of tenan

c:+o

e+o

12 see Braverman and Stig litz (1980] for di1cu 11ion of comp etitiv e
vs. non-c ompe titive contr actua l equi libri a.
* is leH than
13 It can alao be argued that if at an initi al x, tJ
not choose ahare cropp ing. M 1uch , in order
U, the pote ntial tenan t will
ord will have to incre ase
to obtai n aoaeone to culti vate his land, the landl
fact that a tenan t
the plot ■ ize, i.e., reduc e x. We are ignor ing the
ible.
1■ "ind ivisi ble" while land 1a divis

14 The fact that the eize of the plot culti vated by the tenan t does
a polic y instru ment
not chang e over time doea not contr adict ita uae aa
situa tion, once an
by the landl ord. It only aeans that in a ■ tagnant
to chang e it.
opti ul eize baa been deter ained , there ta no need
15 'Ib1a ia perha ps a ratio nale for empi rical obse rvati ons of
loan s.
tenan t• being charg ed high inter est for rathe r au.11

16Some care ia neede d in inter preti ng thia re1u lt. An i~cre ase
labou r, i.e., ex 1upp lied
in 8 raise s the number of effic iency unit• of
throu gh a reduc tion
by each tenan t, and incre ases the number of tenan ts
i• leas than unity ,
in plot eize. If the elas ticit y of subs tituti on
tenan t vill decli ne.
effo rt per tenan t vill decli ne, ao that outpu t per
offae ta this decli ne.
Jut the incre ase in the number of tenan t• -,re than
17s1nce in this aode l landl ords extra ct all the surpl us from their
innov ation s. For
tenan ts, they have no ruao n to resis t techn ologi cal
techn ologi cal inno
theo retic al di1cu 11ion 1 of land lords ' resis tance to
vasan [1979 ],
vatio n, aee Bhad uri [1973 , 1979 ], Newbery [1975 ], Srini
Braverman and Stig litz (1981 ).
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